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Gilded-Age Entrepreneurs and Local
Notables: The Case of the California
“Big Four,” 1861-1877
Evelyne Payen-Variéras
1 In the 1871 novel that gave its name to the Gilded Age, Mark Twain and Charles Dudley
Warner  ridiculed  the  small-town  dreamers  and  speculators  who  lured  Eastern
politicians and patricians into supporting risky and self-serving promotional schemes.
In historical reality, however, some Western « boosters» made it into the ranks of the
national business elite. Thus the promoters of the Central Pacific Railroad, first a small,
Sacramento-based  railroad  company,  built  the  western  branch  of  the  first
transcontinental  railroad and became known as  the  California  “Big  Four”.  Collis  P.
Huntington, Leland Stanford and their associates had started their business careers as
country merchants in the East, then moved to California in the early years of the Gold
Rush, and got to know each other as notables and fellow-Republicans in Sacramento.
Their railroad company, officially formed as a California corporation on 28 June 1861,
obtained a share of the federal loans extended to the Union Pacific Railroad under the
Pacific Railway Act of 1862. It started operations as a 31-mile long local railroad from
Sacramento to Newcastle in June 1864, and continued to build a regional network in
California after the celebrated junction with the Union Pacific at Promontory Point on
10  May 1869.  After  the  financial  crisis  of  1873,  the  group successfully  checked the
expansionist  plans  of  Thomas  Scott’s  Texas  &Pacific  Railroad  with  their  Southern
Pacific Railroad, which became the mainstay of a new transcontinental route across the
South. At the end of Reconstruction in 1877, the Southern Pacific Railroad had already
reached the Colorado River. The story of the California « Big Four» suggests that the
local and regional elites of the Gilded Age did much better than merely survive the
competition of Eastern business empires. 
2 Recent work on the history of Western railroad enterprise reflects the on-going efforts
in  various  sub-disciplines  of  history  to  find  alternatives  to  the  modernization
narratives that have dominated the historiography of the Gilded Age since the 1960’s
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and 1970’s. Through a case study of the Chicago Great Western Railroad, Gerald Berk
called attention to the importance of regional markets and argued that the managers of
railroad companies were not always as intent on building national systems as business
historian Alfred D. Chandler had maintained in his influential  synthesis (Berk 1994,
Chandler 1977). Richard Orsi endorsed Chandler’s effort to shift the emphasis from the
capitalists  to  the  professional  managers,  but  he  questioned  the  relevance  of  the
conventional equation between localism and resistance or opposition to the modern
corporation: his book on the Central and Southern Pacific Railroad companies depicted
them as managerial enterprises which figured prominently among the boosters of both
the  state  and  the  counties  of  California  (Orsi  2005).  In  his  monumental  history  of
transcontinental railroads, Richard White proposed a critical reassessment of the social
benefits  of  modern  transportation  infrastructures  and  documented  a  legacy  of
environmental havoc, economic instability and political corruption (White 2011). The
categories  formerly  used to  discuss  the history of  Western railroads,  especially  the
opposition  between  mature  and  premature  enterprise,  or  between  forward-looking
managers and “robber barons”, seem to have exhausted their usefulness. 
3 This article attempts to shed new light on the business and political practices of Gilded-
Age entrepreneurs through an analysis of the relations between a group of railroad
promoters –the California “Big Four”- and the local notables of Northern California,
including business  people,  professionals  and politicians.  The first  part  of  the paper
places this story in the context of entrepreneurial mobility: the “Big Four” built their
own trans-regional  networks,  which meant  that  they could exploit  the  competitive
advantages of different regions and the rivalries between different communities. While
tapping the resources of the U.S. industrial and financial centers, they also turned to
local notables for land, supplies and credit, as well as for executive and professional
work. The rest of the paper is a study of their approaches to network and transactions
management,  as  they  can  be  reconstituted  from  a  variety  of  source  materials:  the
letters  sent  by  Mark  Hopkins  to  the  New  York  office  of  Collis  P.  Huntington,  the
testimonies collected by the Pacific Railway Commission in 1887, as well as the legal
documents  printed on the occasion of  the many law suits  that  the associates  were
involved  in  represent  a  wealth  of  documents  that  shed  light  on  the  associates’
contentious relations with business partners, professionals and politicians1. The article
argues  that  the  associates’  business  practices  did  not  reflect  simple  alternatives
between integration and market transactions, but a wide range of other arrangements
based on partnership agreements, credit relations and negotiations with local boosters
and politicians. My analysis of these complex and unstable business relations highlights
the protean forms taken by the corporations of the Gilded Age. 
 
The resources of Sacramento entrepreneurs 
4 When Collis P. Huntington and his associate Mark Hopkins, along with Leland Stanford
and Charles Crocker, decided to back the plans of civil engineer Theodore Judah and
venture into railroad building, they had been residents of Sacramento for ten years or
less.  Their  formative  experiences  as  country  merchants,  petty  entrepreneurs  or
professionals  exemplify the importance of  mobility in nineteenth-century American
society. As their biographers have shown, Huntington, Hopkins, Stanford and Crocker
had lived in different communities in the East and Midwest and tried their hand at
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different business pursuits  before concentrating on the sale of  mining supplies and
other goods to the gold districts of the Sierra Nevada foothills. Collis Huntington was
born in Connecticut and made his start as a peddler. He worked with his brother Solon
who had set up a store in Oneonta, New York. Along with other forty-niners, he arrived
in San Francisco in the fall of 1849 with a small stock of goods that he and Solon had
bought in Oneonta (Lavender 7-8). Mark Hopkins was raised in upper New York State
and Michigan. Both Stanford and Crocker were born in Central New York State and
spent time in the Midwest: Stanford had a law practice in Wisconsin before he joined
his older brothers in California in 1852. Charles Crocker had owned and managed a
foundry in Indiana, which he sold before coming to California overland with some of
his brothers in 18502. The last figure in the group of Central Pacific Railroad promoters
was Charles Crocker’s elder brother Edwin, who was trained as a civil  engineer but
became a lawyer in Sacramento. 
5 The founders of the Central Pacific Railroad relied both on their connections with the
East and on the opportunities offered in the West. This they had already done as Gold-
Rush merchants: in the late 1850’s, Collis P. Huntington and his partner Mark Hopkins
imported goods from New York, mostly hardware and tools for the mining industry.
Charles Crocker dealt in shoes, boots, clothing and other dry goods. After 1854, Charles
Stanford  left  California,  settled  in  Schenectady  County,  NY,  and  became  the  main
purchasing agent for his brothers’ mercantile firm3. Collis P. Huntington did the same
for the Central Pacific Railroad in the early 1860s, going back and forth between New
York and California  and touring the  industrial  and financial  centers  of  the  East  to
borrow money and buy railroad equipment. When he was in Washington with Theodore
Judah in the summer of 1862, Huntington also attended to the negotiations that led to
the enactment of the Pacific Railway Act signed by Lincoln on July 1, 1862. In addition
to visiting the members of the California Congressional delegation in the 37th Congress,
Huntington  revived  his  acquaintance  with  Richard  Franchot,  an  old  friend  of  his
brother  Solon  who  represented  the  district  of  Schenectady  in  the  House.  Besides
lobbying for  favorable  federal  legislation,  Huntington also  negotiated a  deal  with a
group  of  railroad  promoters,  Alexander  Houston,  Timothy  Dane  and  Charles
McLaughlin, who were planning to build railroads between San Francisco and San José:
he agreed to let them build the westernmost section of the transcontinental railroad
between Sacramento and San Francisco4. The Pacific Railway Act of 1862 allowed the
Central Pacific Railroad to build their line westward to San Francisco bay, but shortly
after the passage of the act, the company’s rights to federal aid west of Sacramento
were  assigned  to  a  Western  Pacific  Railroad  C°  incorporated  by  the  Houston  and
McLaughlin group on 13 December 1862, which also applied for county and state aid in
California.
6 Local boosters offered decisive support to Huntington and his associates in the early
years  of  railroad  construction.  While  the  first  public  stock-subscription  campaigns
were a complete failure in San Francisco, many Sacramentans bought shares of the
Central  Pacific  Railroad.  stock.  According  to  a  list  of  Central  Pacific  stockholders
compiled by  the  company for  the  U.S.  Secretary  of  the  Treasury in  June 1863,  229
stockholders  out  of  253  were  residents  of  Sacramento  County,  21  came from rural
counties  in California and only two appeared as  residents of  San Francisco –Amasa
Philip Stanford, one of Stanford’s brothers, being one of them5. Daniel Strong, a miner
and storekeeper from Placer County who had helped Theodore Judah locate a possible
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railroad route through the Sierra Nevada, and a director of the Central Pacific C° until
the summer of 1863, led some of the stock-subscription campaigns. He described them
to the Pacific Railroad Commission in 1887 in these terms: 
The merchants, saloon men, draymen, and everybody in fact, took an interest in the
matter, and took from five to ten and fifteen shares of stock simply to encourage it [the
concern]. They said that if anything came out of it it was bound to do business for
Sacramento, and they simply took hold of it to show their interest in the matter6. 
7 It is not clear how much of this stock was fully paid, however, as the General Railroad
Law of California only required the immediate payment of 10% of the par value of the
stock of a railroad corporation. In his testimony to the Pacific Railway Commission,
Leland  Stanford  stated  that  the  directors  of  the  Central  Pacific  Railroad  levied
assessments  on  stockholders,  and  that  many  early  stockholders  never  paid  their
assessments7. 
8 Shows of public support among Sacramento boosters certainly helped the directors of
the  railroad  company  win  a  majority  of  the  votes  in  the  referendum  on  local
government  subsidies  to  the  Central  Pacific  Railroad  C°.  On  April  25,  1863,  the
California state legislature had authorized the counties of Sacramento and Placer to
hold elections to approve the issuance of county bonds to subscribe to respectively
3 000  and  2 500  shares  of  the  stock  of  the  company.  The  associates  received  these
county  bonds  –amounting  to  a  par  value  of  $ 550 000-  in  September  1863.  As  the
promise of federal loans was not fulfilled before May 1865, local subsidies played an
important role at the beginning of railroad construction. Between October 1863, when
Charles  Crocker  really  started  track-laying  work  on  the  first  18  miles  of  the  road
(Daggett  83),  and  May  1865,  when  the  first  instalment  of  U.S.  Treasury  bonds  was
delivered to the directors of the Central Pacific Company, railroad construction was
financed  through  the  sale  of  county  bonds,  as  well  as  through  short-term  loans
obtained from a wide range of lending institutions both in the East and in California.
9 From  the  start,  the  associates  viewed  the  regional  and  the  national  dimension  of
railroad enterprise as complementary, and indeed it is impossible to separate them: the
Union  government’s  plan  to  build  the  Western  link  of  the  transcontinental  line
enhanced their chances of success as local entrepreneurs; conversely, until 1865 federal
loans were conditioned upon the completion of 40 miles of road – 20 after the Pacific
Railway Act of 1864. The credit of the associates with Eastern financiers depended on
their ability to demonstrate that they were bona fide entrepreneurs rather than rash
speculators.  Their decision to invest in a toll  road, the Dutch Flat and Donner Lake
Wagon Road, created in November 1861, made sense in this context. The combined rail
and  wagon  road  was  designed  to  capture  part  of  the  regional  traffic  between
Sacramento and the silver mining districts of the Comstock Lode in the Sierra Nevada.
Shippers and passengers would travel on the unfinished railroad part of the way, and
continue their journey on teamster-operated stages and carriages to Dutch Flat and
Virginia City (Evans 96-98). Through this scheme, the associates hoped to demonstrate
that their road could be profitable even in the short run: operating revenue would not
only supplement the funds drawn from short-term loans, but also facilitate the sale of
company bonds. The letters exchanged between Huntington and the Crocker brothers
in the mid-1860’s, as well as those sent by Edwin Crocker to Cornelius Cole, a fellow-
Republican and member of the House of Representatives in the 38th Congress in 1864,
show  that  the  associates  considered  that  rapid  progress  in  the  construction and
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operation of the railroad line East of Sacramento would make a favorable impression on
Eastern politicians and financiers8. 
10 Collis Huntington and his associates created a trans-regional corporation: in December
1863, Huntington brought his wife to New York, eventually bought a house there, and
came to California once a year in the summer months. He was the railroad company’s
chief  financial  and  purchasing  agent  in  the  East,  as  well  as  its  main  lobbyist  in
Washington. Leland Stanford, the president of the Central Pacific Railroad, remained in
California and took charge of the company’s political and financial affairs in the West.
In the East, Huntington used the federal Treasury bonds and the company bonds to buy
rail,  locomotives  and  rolling-stock,  as  well  as  some  construction  supplies.  Charles
Crocker handled relations with subcontractors and supervised the work of construction
crews with the  help  of  his  superintendent  James H.  Strobridge.  While  construction
workers were hired in California, Huntington tried to convince railroad engineers and
experienced executives to leave the East and work for the Central Pacific Railroad. In
November  1867,  for  example,  he  hired  John  Corning,  the  assistant  general
superintendent of  the New York Central,  to  fill  the same position with the Central
Pacific  Railroad9.  In  1869,  upon  the  completion  of  the  main  Central  Pacific  line,
Huntington insisted on hiring a general superintendent who had been working for a
major  railroad  company  of  the  Midwest,  the  Chicago,  Burlington  and  Quincy,  for
fourteen years.
11 Executive work within the railroad corporation did not only entail the management of
the technical and commercial aspects of railroad operations, however. The associates
turned to  some of  their  Sacramento  friends  for  other  tasks.  Some executives  were
“insiders” who could be trusted with confidential information, while others were hired
for their knowledge of local laws, conditions and people. Edward H. Miller Jr., a former
associate  of  Mark Hopkins  in  a  Sacramento  grocery  business,  belonged to  the  first
category of salaried executives: as secretary of the Central Pacific railroad from 1864
onward,  he  was in  charge of  the books of  the company.  Benjamin Redding was an
executive of the second kind: originally a newspaperman and well-known anti-slavery
Democrat,  Redding  had  served  as  mayor  of  Sacramento  in  the  1850’s,  and  then as
California Secretary of State between 1863 and 1867. He became the chief land agent of
the Central Pacific Railroad in 1868, and received a salary as head of the company’s land
department until  his death in 188210.  Likewise, Silas W. Sanderson, who became the
head of the legal department of the Central Pacific after Edwin B. Crocker retired from
business in 1869, was a former justice of the California Supreme Court. 
 
Business partners, creditors and salaried executives
12 The transactions between the associates and the Northern California businessmen and
professionals have generally been described as a set of abuses or more recently as an
example of the disorder wrought by the ruthlessness and incompetence of the Gilded-
Age  business  elites  (White  2011).  Indeed  the  construction  and  management  of  the
Central Pacific Railroad C° did not entail simple choices between market relations and
integration in managerial organizations. Transactions with individuals and firms were
not exclusively based on transfers of cash, but they also included credit relations as
well as a wide range of agreements designed to purchase friendly cooperation and good
will  with minimal  outlays  of  cash.  Local  businessmen sometimes appeared as  mere
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parties to specific agreements, but also as partners and stockholders, holders of bonds
and promissory notes,  as well  as in intermediary situations as indebted partners or
semi-independent agents paid in salary and expenses. The associates’ efforts to revise
the terms of their transactions with their business partners and creditors were shaped
both  by  the  fluctuations  of  their  financial  situation  and  by  their  pursuit  of
entrepreneurial independence. 
13 The management of railroad construction contracts on the main line of the Central
Pacific attracted much attention from the U.S. Pacific Railway Commission of 1887 and
is well-documented. For the first 18 sections of the road –18 miles from Sacramento to
present-day  Roseville,  the  directors  of  the  company  granted  a  single  contract  to
Charles Crocker, who had previously resigned from the board in December 1862. For
the  second  series  of  contracts  granted  in  the  spring  of  1863,  which  covered
construction from Roseville to Newcastle,  they diversified their contractors:  besides
Charles  Crocker,  they  chose  five  other  entrepreneurs.  In  June  1865,  however,  after
receiving their first instalment of U.S. Treasury bonds, they reverted to their policy of
dealing with a single contractor and passed a resolution allowing Charles Crocker &C°
to build the road eastward without signing a formal contract (Daggett 72). In the fall of
1867, after Huntington had succeeded in convincing Civil War financiers Fisk &Hatch to
sell  company  bonds  to  build  the  railroad  from  the  California-Nevada  state  line
eastward11, the associates decided to create a contracting company whose stock would
be equally distributed between Charles and Edwin Crocker,  Collis  Huntington, Mark
Hopkins and Leland Stanford. From December 1867 onward, the Contract & Finance C°
secured  all  the  construction  contracts  for  the  building  of  the  associates’  railroads,
except in Utah where they had to make specific arrangements with the Mormon leader
Brigham Young. In 1874, the associates created a similar ancillary company which built
most of the Southern Pacific Railroad line, the Western Development Co°.
14 The terms of the construction contracts were thus repeatedly altered depending on
circumstances. Moreover, the transactions with contractors included a combination of
cash  and  equity,  so  that  construction  contracts  amounted  in  part  to  agreements
between business associates: for the second series of contracts, both Charles Crocker
and the small contractors received 17.5% of their pay in Central Pacific stock (Lavender
137).  According  to  the  testimonies  of  the  associates  before  the  Pacific  Railway
Commission of 1887, the 1867 contract between the Central Pacific Railroad and the
Contract & Finance C° provided that the former would pay $ 86 000 per mile of railroad,
half in cash and half in Central Pacific Railroad stock. When the associates were called
upon to explain the relation between the railroad company and the Contract & Finance
C°,  Leland  Stanford  mentioned  the  need  to  secure  friendly  cooperation  between
railroad company and building contractor:  independent contractors would not have
been be  willing  to  wait  in  case  the  directors  of  the  railroad  company  had  trouble
securing  funds,  nor  would  they  have  accepted  to  work  as  fast  as  the  competition
between  Central  Pacific  and  Union  Pacific  demanded.  Stanford  testified  that  by
controlling the contractor, the associates could adjust the timing of construction work
to  the  fluctuations  of  their  financial  resources12.  Turning  contractors  into  business
partners who would agree to take a part of their pay in the form of future profits was a
way of purchasing good will. Dealing with a single contractor minimized the conflicts of
interest between financiers and contractors. 
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15 Various sources of information on other transactions show that the associates secured
work and land through temporary partnership agreements with petty entrepreneurs
and land developers. The Dutch Flat wagon road first included two managing partners,
Daniel W. Strong and E.L. Bradley, and then only Bradley13. In the fall of 1865, when the
teamsters combined to raise freight rates between the end of the railroad line and the
mining towns of  Nevada,  Crocker,  Stanford and Hopkins signed an agreement with
them, which took the form of a new company, the Central Transportation C°. Thus the
associates obtained rates that induced shippers to choose the combined rail wagon road
over alternative routes14. It seems that Charles Crocker resorted to a similar device to
obtain ties in 1867. When he was interviewed by one of historian Hubert Bancroft’s
assistants, Crocker explained that he had difficulty getting local entrepreneurs to work
for  the  Central  Pacific  Railroad,  especially  since  he  needed  massive  quantities  of
railroad  ties  to  be  delivered or  made  in  the  Sierra  Nevada.  So  he  started  building
sawmills near Truckee and induced a minor partner, Allan Towles, to manage them15. In
March  1868,  Stanford  acquired  land  and  wharfing  rights  near  San  Francisco  Bay
through a deal with Horace Carpentier, a land developer who had previously obtained
exclusive  wharfing  rights  on  the  Oakland  waterfront.  Carpentier  transferred  these
rights to a new company called the Oakland Waterfront C°, whose ownership was split
between himself, Stanford, and a few other prominent San Francisco businessmen like
Lloyd Tevis (Daggett 88-91). As with the contractors, such agreements were designed to
secure good will  from minor business partners. However, the “Big Four” kept these
ventures separate from the railroad companies that formed the core of their business
enterprises.
16 A couple of letters sent by Mark Hopkins to Huntington in the spring of 1865 shed light
on  the  relations  between  the  associates  and  some  of  their  leading  creditors  in
California.  Hopkins  told  Huntington  that  Darius  O.  Mills  and  some  of  his  business
partners in the Bank of California might be interested in taking an equity stake in the
Central Pacific Railroad C°. Darius O. Mills was well-known to the associates: he had
opened  a  bank  in  Sacramento  in  the  early  1850’s,  and  then  founded  the  Bank  of
California with San Francisco financier William Ralston in 1864. Mills appeared in the
June  1863  list  of  early  Central  Pacific  stockholders.  The  Central  Pacific  C°  had  an
account with his Sacramento bank, D.O. Mills and C°, which also served as trustee for
some of the trust mortgages created to guarantee the company’s early bonds16. Mills
and Ralston had considerable resources, drawn mostly from their investments in the
mining district of the Comstock Lode in Nevada. Closer business relations with the Bank
of  California  held  up  the  promise  of  better  terms  on  loans  and  larger  financial
resources. When he apprised Huntington of the ongoing negotiations with Mills, Mark
Hopkins dwelled on the risks attached to the admission of passive investors into the
associates’ circle: he noted that Mills and his friends “[were] not quite ready to give
anything, except to put in one half of what we have actually put in & become in all
respects halvers with us”17. 
17 Thus  the  associates  weighed  the  advantages  of  expanding  their  financial  resources
against  the  risk  of  taking  in  partners  who  would  not  be  entirely  trustworthy.  As
Hopkins further wrote in July 1865, 
In regard to enlarging the “ring”, nothing more has been said or done with the parties
proposed here, and it appears to me nothing need be done provided you are able there
to negotiate our securities so as to go ahead as we are now going and as we propose to
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go. If we can go to Dutch Flat by spring the earnings of the road and the Wagon road
will largely aid us & our credit in every way18. 
18 In the summer of 1865, the delivery of the first federal Treasury bonds had brightened
the prospects of Huntington and his associates. Hopkins’ comments suggest that as far
as possible, they preferred to rely on operating revenue from the combined rail and
wagon road, as well as on the sale of bonds in the East to maintain their independence
from their California creditors. After 1865, the associates continued to borrow heavily
from the Bank of California, and they occasionally engaged in joint-business ventures
with Mills and his friends. In the spring and summer of 1869, for example, they helped
Darius  O.  Mills  and  Lloyd  Tevis  set  up  an  express  company  which  eventually  took
control of Wells Fargo19.  However, they also diversified their creditors and used the
Contract &Finance C° as their main bank. The book-keeping operations pertaining to
the transfers of funds between the railroad company and the Contract &Finance C°
were entrusted to the care of a salaried executive, William E. Brown, who had been the
private secretary of Leland Stanford when the latter was governor. If circumstances
permitted, then, the associates’ preferred model of corporate governance was based on
cooperation  between  salaried  executives  and  a  small  group  of  entrepreneurs  who
invested an equal amount of time and work into their common ventures. They feared
the  conflicts  of  interests  inherent  in  extended  partnerships:  minority  stockholders
were likely to sell their securities at the wrong time or without regard for the welfare
of the company; they could also convey confidential information to outsiders and even
back  competing  transportation  companies;  they  could  also  create  scandal  by
challenging the decisions of corporate directors.
19 These observations are consistent with the complaints voiced by Theodore Judah and
Daniel Strong, who stated in various documents that the “Big Four” ignored them as
well  as  the  other  Central  Pacific  Railroad  directors  who  represented  minority
stockholders until the summer of 1863. According to Strong, the “Big Four” arranged to
meet  and  make  decisions  outside  of  the  regular  meetings  of  the  board,  which
eventually led the minority directors –Judah and Strong, as well as merchants James
Bailey, Charles Marsh and Lucius A. Booth- to resign between the summer and the fall
of 186320. The associates’ handling of the railroad construction contracts after a second
issue of Central Pacific capital stock on October 8, 1864 strengthened their hold on the
company, but their souring relations with their Sacramento friends remained a major
problem for them, especially when Samuel Brannan, a prominent Sacramento land-
owner and railroad promoter, filed a suit against them on July 1st, 1870: in the fall of
1864,  Brannan had acquired 200 shares of  Central Pacific  stock,  probably by selling
rolling stock to the associates (Lavender 188, 260). Later on, as he needed money and
could not agree with Stanford on the sale of his stock, Brannan sued the associates and
claimed a portion of the profits public accounting of the profits that they had derived
from the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad. At the time of the Brannan suit,
the associates set out to purchase all shares of stock issued by the company before 1864
and remaining in « outside» hands, to protect themselves from costly scandals and law
suits (Lavender 278-280). Around the same time, they also bought the shares of Central
and  Western  Pacific  stock  owned  by  Sacramento,  Placer  and  Santa  Clara  Counties
(Lavender 413, note 18)21. Thus they made clear that the Central Pacific Railroad C° was
an independent, private enterprise rather than a joint-venture with local boosters. 
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20 The success of the associates’ efforts to maintain their independence from troublesome
minority stockholders depended both on the growth of corporate earnings and on the
sale  of  corporate  bonds.  But  corporate  earnings  and  long-term  debt  were  also
supplemented by short-term credit.  In California, interest rates on short-term loans
ran as high as 1% a month in the 1860’s, but call loans could be obtained rather easily.
The associates  signed promissory notes  to  supplement  their  cash transactions  with
local entrepreneurs, for example when they acquired local railroad companies between
1865 and 1869. In the summer of 1865, Hopkins thus told Huntington that Stanford
proposed  to  purchase  the  control  of  the  Sacramento  Valley  Railroad  for  less  than
$ 300,000, “two-thirds in cash down and the remainder in 6 or 12 months”. Hopkins
thought  it  was  a  good  idea,  provided  Huntington  “could  get  the  money  without
cramping [them] for funds to carry on [their] work on [their] own line”22. Two years
later, a deal with Charles McLaughlin for the acquisition of the Western Pacific Railroad
C° in June 1867 entailed the payment of gold and currency at specific dates within two
years, as well as the transfer to McLaughlin of the lands that his company had received
from the federal government (Orsi 2005, 109). In September 1867, the associates offered
railroad promoter Charles Lincoln Wilson their notes at one and two years amounting
to $ 75 000 and 10% yearly interest for the purchase of two local roads to the north of
Sacramento, as well as the franchise of the California and Oregon Railroad, “provided
[the associates could] get bondholders to cancel unpaid bonds and get the property free
from litigation and entanglements”23. 
21 The  availability  of  cash  from  the  sale  of  bonds  as  well  as  from  railroad  earnings
enhanced  the  associates’  leverage  in  their  negotiations  with  Northern  California
entrepreneurs. But the management of short-term credit was also an important issue.
If note holders could renew their loans, let them run indefinitely –subject to call and
the payment of interest- they could also on other occasions call them back at the wrong
time. Such concerns appear for example in letters regarding the promissory notes held
by  Alfred  A.  Cohen,  a  San  Francisco  lawyer  and  businessman  who  had  sold  the
associates two Eastbay railroad and ferry companies in 1868 and 1869. In October 1869,
Hopkins  told  Huntington  that  a  note  amounting  to  $ 261 375  drawing  1%  monthly
interest and payable on call was due on December 10, 1869. He hoped that Huntington
could find the money to pay Cohen in the East, as Stanford could not do it in California
and the railroad company also needed money to pay laborers’s wages. Hopkins stated
that 
Whenever he [Cohen] is discharged of his present undefined position or whenever
there is a big tight in the money market (…) he will be pretty certain to call on us
impatiently24. 
22 According to the documents filed by Cohen when the associates sued him in March
1876, the full payment of this debt occurred only in February 1876. In the meantime,
Cohen was allowed to continue to supervise the operations of his Alameda Railroad C°.
In the fall of 1870, Stanford even offered that Cohen “enter the service of himself and
his  associates”,  drawing the same salary as  Cohen had received as  president  of  his
Oakland and Alameda Railroad and Ferry companies25. Cohen was paid a regular salary
as “attorney and agent” for the Central Pacific Railroad, and they also paid the rent of
his law office. 
23 The case of Alfred A. Cohen epitomizes the ambiguous status of some of the attorneys
and  executives  who  worked  for  the  “Big  Four”.  He  worked  as  an  attorney  on  the
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settlement  of  claims  related  to  railroad  accidents;  he  also  helped  the  associates
purchase  land  around  the  Bay  Area.  But  he  also  had  his  own  law  practice  –he
occasionally worked for rival railroad companies like the California Pacific Railroad-
and his own business enterprises. Hopkins always doubted Cohen’s loyalty, as he wrote
to Huntington in 1872:
Cohen I hear intends going East soon. Where he is in matters generally I don’t know of
course but although under salary with us, he has always borne an intimate and friendly
relation to the Bank of California –has always found it to pay him well to be their
friend, and it would be deceiving ourselves to expect anything different of him26.
24 To the associates, Cohen was at once an unreliable business partner, an independent
professional and a salaried executive. He sold railroad iron and supplies, and owned an
interest in the schooners that carried coal from the Mount Diablo mine of Contra Costa
County  to  the  Bay  Area.  The  coal  that  the  Central  Pacific  Railroad  C°  occasionally
bought  from  this  mine  was  delivered  by  Cohen’s  schooners.  In  1872,  Cohen  even
worked with Darius O. Mills on a plan to buy the Central Pacific Railroad C° from the
associates, although nothing came out of it. One of the issues in the 1876 law suit was to
determine  whether  Cohen had  been  an  employee  of  the  railroad  company  –as  the
associates claimed- or whether it  had been understood from the beginning that  he
would continue to devote part of his time to his own business interests27. 
25 Another example of the hybrid status of some corporate executives can be found with
David D. Colton, who became a kind of “debtor-associate” of the “Big Four” from 1874
until  his  death in 1878.  In 1874,  the associates  had moved the headquarters  of  the
Central Pacific Railroad C° to San Francisco. Huntington resided in New York and came
to California only in the summer months. His relations with Stanford were increasingly
strained; Edwin B. Crocker had been incapacitated by a stroke in 1869; Hopkins was
getting old and did not write as regularly as in the past. Huntington was overworked
and desperately needed a correspondent and a financial agent on the West Coast. He
was also looking for allies in San Francisco to push the construction of the Southern
Pacific Railroad C°, a company that the associates had acquired in 1869. In 1870, the
associates had invited Colton to invest in their Rocky Mountain Coal and Iron C°,  a
company that owned coal lands near Evanston, Wyoming. Colton was well-known to
the San Francisco bankers and mining capitalists, as he had been superintendent of the
Amador gold mine in the early 1870’s (Shoupe 296-97). 
26 From October 1874 onward, Colton worked as vice-president of the Southern Pacific
and received a salary from the Central Pacific C° for his functions as financial director
of the latter company, as Leland Stanford did for his work as president, Hopkins as
treasurer, and Huntington as vice-president, financial agent and attorney. But Colton
was  also  admitted  into  the  partnership  through  the  creation  of  the  Western
Development C°, whose capital stock was divided into five equal shares, as the capital
stock of the former Contract &Finance C° had been. Equality between the partners was
created  through  a  peculiar  and  rather  artificial  agreement:  Colton  received  20 000
shares of Central Pacific stock, 20 0000 shares of Southern Pacific stock, and gave the
associates  a  one-million  dollar  promissory  note  in  exchange28.  Through  this
arrangement,  Huntington  hoped  to  get  executive  work,  but  also  to  increase  the
“political and financial strength” of the company, as he wrote in a letter to Hopkins in
January 187629. Colton was no a mere figurehead, but his presence on the board of the
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Southern Pacific Railroad C° was supposed to indicate that he represented prominent
San Francisco capitalists.
 
Railroad management, political bargaining and public
relations
27 From the start, the “Big Four” weighed the political advantages and costs of reciprocity
in their  transactions with local  businessmen, many of  whom, like Stanford himself,
were  active  in  California  politics.  While  they  found  competitive  advantages  and
opportunities in different regions, and instructed their managers to maximize earnings
by keeping operating costs as low as possible and adjusting railroad rates to what the
traffic  would  bear,  they  also  discussed the  value  and the  costs  of  “good neighbor”
business  practices.  Political  influence  at  different  government  levels  could  make  a
difference in terms of access to credit and land – waterfront land in San Francisco Bay
was especially valuable- and was also a form of insurance against what the associates
called  “blackmail”,  i.e.  unreasonable  demands  on  the  railroad  companies  that  they
controlled. As early as 1863, the Central Pacific Railroad C° was embroiled in protracted
litigation about the subsidies to be granted by the state of California and by the County
of  San  Francisco  (Daggett  33-40).  In  August  1867,  the  attempt  of  the  Board  of
Supervisors  of  Placer  C°  to  raise  the  railroad  company  tax  from  $ 440,  0250  to
$ 1, 100, 625  inaugurated  a  long  series  of  tax  disputes  with  the  local  and  state
governments30.  In  November  1867,  as  construction  crews  were  still  making  slow
progress through the Sierra Nevada, Mark Hopkins complained that the delegates of
Placer and Nevada counties were already drawing a bill to reduce the maximum rates
authorized by the state railroad law31. 
28 Edwin  B.  Crocker  and  later  Silas  W.  Sanderson  mounted  legal  challenges  to  the
demands  of  local  boosters  and  anti-monopolists.  At  the  same  time,  the  associates
continued to bargain with public officials, boosters’ associations and large land-holders
to  defray  the  costs  of  building new railroad lines  (Daggett  28).  They also  expected
political  returns  from  their  transactions  with  influential  businessmen.  In  1867,  for
example, Hopkins told Huntington that purchasing all locomotives in the East could be
unwise  as  long  as  the  associates  needed  the  support  of  their  California  neighbors:
building locomotives locally « would be regarded with popular favor in all parts of the
State and Pacific coast». The associates « [were] not yet independent of the opinion of
the  Cal[ifornia]  public  and  their  representation»32.  This  remark  followed  a  visit  of
Orville Lambard, the owner or manager of the Sacramento Iron Works and a minor
stockholder in the Central Pacific railroad C° at the time, who had offered to build
locomotives  for  the  Central  Pacific  C°.  Hopkins  acknowledged  that  the competitive
advantages of Eastern manufacturers should prevail, and he hoped to break free from
the  influence  of  local  sentiment  as  soon  as  possible,  but  he  suggested  that  the
associates make temporary concessions to local businessmen. 
29 In their quest for political influence, the associates first turned to their personal friends
among Republican politicians in Northern California: Collis P. Huntington and Edwin B.
Crocker had been involved in the founding of the Republican party in Sacramento in
1856, along with Cornelius Cole, a lawyer who became District Attorney for the County
of Sacramento in 1859. Stanford had been the Republican candidate for State Treasurer
in September 1857, and then he served for one term as governor of California between
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1861 and 1863. Huntington struck a long-lasting friendship with Aaron A. Sargent, a
lawyer  and  newspaperman  from  Nevada  City,  who  was  elected  to  the  House  of
Representatives in 1860 (Lavender 63, 72-74). After the end of the Civil War, however,
the associates expanded their networks of political allies to Democrats and played on
the  competition  between  the  two  political  parties  to  gain  more  leverage  in  their
relations with politicians. On one of his visits to Republican Congressman Cornelius
Cole in Washington in April 1867, for example, Huntington pointedly mentioned that he
would also bring his requests to Cole’s Democratic rival John Conness33. Huntington’s
pragmatic justification for this behavior was that 
in business we must use all the elements necessary to succeed, and as we shall always
want more or less legislation, I have thought it would be well to have some Democrats
connected with us34.
30 Both Huntington and Stanford hired some of their friends as lobbyists to attend to the
company’s affairs in the California legislature as well as in the U.S. Congress. Stanford’s
main lobbyist in California was William B. Carr, a former brick-mason who became a
successful entrepreneur as a miner and a builder of ditches, levees and railroads, and
later a large landholder35. As a railroad contractor in the early 1860’s, Carr had been
involved with Charles McLaughlin in the Western Pacific Railroad. Besides lobbyists,
the  associates  also  hired  agents  for  specific  missions:  in  1872,  for  example,  civil
engineer  William  B.  Hyde  was  sent  to  Los  Angeles  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  the
construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad to that city.
31 The remuneration of political friends and allies took many different forms and was
often a problem for the associates.  Politicians asked them to support their political
campaigns, for example by using their influence with railroad employees, or by seeking
railroad land for some of their own friends. Charles Maclay, who had been a member of
the State  Senate between 1868 and 1873,  thus wrote  to  Charles  Crocker  in  1875 to
complain about the superintendent of the Southern Pacific Railroad C° in Los Angeles,
Eldridge E. Hewitt, who did not support the Republican candidate for county treasurer: 
Having always worked for your interest and that of your Company, I would respectfully
ask you to act promptly by telegraph to Hewitt requesting him to support Temple and
at the same time inform me that I may conclude negociations [sic] for the advancement
of our Congressman36.
32 Maclay  explained  that  his  candidate  for  county  treasurer  had  backed  the  railroad
company in the 1872 referendum over the grant of Los Angeles County and city bonds
to the Southern Pacific Railroad, while the other candidate was connected with a group
of  businessmen  who  had  opposed  the  railroad  subsidy.  In  the  same  letter,  Maclay
bluntly told Crocker that he controlled about 300 votes in the San Fernando region and
warned him that his support to the railroad candidates for the California delegation in
Congressmen was not unconditional. 
33 The relations between the associates and local newspapermen were probably shaped by
similar  forms  of  bargaining.  The  associates  expected  to  get  fair  treatment  from
newspaper  publishers  through contracts  for  printing  jobs  or  for  the  publication of
railroad schedules and advertisements for land sales (Deverell  132).  Marcus Boruck,
who was the owner and editor of a small weekly San Francisco magazine, the Spirit of
the Times, explained to the Pacific Railway Commission in 1887 that the Central Pacific
C° subscribed to his magazine for its station agents. He also had a job as a clerk in the
California state legislature and attended to the interests of the railroad company there
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as a lobbyist37. But the favors granted to some newspaper publishers alienated others:
the Sacramento Union had supported the company against its many detractors in the San
Francisco  press  in  the  early  1860’s;  when  the  paper  suddenly  turned  against  the
company in 1868, Huntington ascribed this reversal to his associates’ decision to give
the printing business of the railroad company to the firm of Henry S. Crocker, one of
Charles Crocker’s brothers (Evans 186).
34 The  associates’  uneasy  compromises  between  business  and  local  sentiment  caused
tensions within their group. Advertising the earnings of the railroad companies was
good for their credit with Eastern financiers, but it weakened their defense against the
California anti-monopolists, as Hopkins explained to Huntington in 1867: 
For the purpose of giving to our Railroad bonds credit and standing in the Eastern and
European market of course you give the greatest possible publicity to our reports of 
large [Hopkins’ underlining] monthly earnings and our small operating expenses. This
is sound policy and right. But when our California Newspapers republish those
statements, copied from Eastern Journals, they are too often accompanied by remarks
tending to claim that these large earnings proves (sic) that the company charges too
high freight and passenger rates, and that the Legislature should reduce the rates by an
amendment to the Cal Railroad law etc.etc.38. 
35 Huntington, Crocker and later Colton also criticized Stanford for his costly deals with
Northern  California  businessmen  –the  promise  of  a  1/20th of  the  Southern  Pacific
Railroad land grant to Lloyd Tevis during the negotiations that enabled the associates
to acquire that railroad company, for example - as well as for the pay of his lobbyists -
the grant of railroad company bonds to Carr as compensation for some of his services,
for example39. Moreover, Stanford’s occasional attempts to reward his political friends
with jobs within the railroad company were frowned upon both by the other associates
and  by  the  salaried  managers  of  the  railroad  company.  In  the  fall  of  1869,  the
comments of Charles Crocker and Alban N. Towne after a train collision involving the
Western Pacific Railroad, one of the local roads acquired by the group in 1868, show
that they blamed the accident on the superintendent of the road, Josiah Johnson, who
had been appointed by Stanford. In a letter to Huntington, Crocker condemned what he
called « the present system of employing pets regardless of their experience». Alban N.
Towne, the newly-recruited superintendent of the Central Pacific, was just as blunt,
and wrote that « Mr Johnson [could not] select and discipline men as is expected from a
man holding that position»40. 
36 Although they sparked much controversy, neither the activities of lobbyists nor the
practice of granting railroad passes to business and political allies interfered with the
prerogatives  of  the  managers  who  controlled  railroad  operations  and  procured
earnings.  The  same  was  true  for  the  more  legitimate  activities  of  publicists  and
newspapermen who highlighted the common interests between the railroad company
and the local communities. The promotional activities attached to the sale of land from
the Central Pacific and California &Oregon land grants became the cornerstone of the
associates’ public relations policy in California. Hopkins believed that such publicity
helped “silence the outcry against the ‘grasping monopoly’”. Huntington thought that
advertising the prospects of California facilitated the sale of bonds in the East and in
Europe41.  According  to  Richard  Orsi,  the  land  department  of  the  Central  Pacific  C°
consigned some parts of the railroad land grant to local associations like the California
Immigrant Union and the Pacific Coast Land Bureau. The brochures published by the
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land department promised moderate prices and easy terms of  payment on railroad
land42. In the mid-1870’s, the railroad company allowed potential settlers to buy land
« on time», over a period of five years, at a time when the interest rates given by rural
banks to their customers varied widely (White 2001). 
37 The associates also decided to secure good will from the California press by backing
newcomers in the field of newspaper publishing.  In the early 1870’s,  they bought a
small Sacramento newspaper, the Sacramento Daily Record, and left the paper to the care
of a young journalist and leader of prison and temperance reform, William H. Mills. In
1874, when Huntington found out that the Sacramento Union was for sale, he suggested
that his associates help Mills buy the Union, probably by lending him money: 
Now, if this paper is bought by outsiders, it will either be against us or a leech on us,
when if it is bought by Mills and consolidated with the Record, it will be all right, as I
think Mills an honorable man43.
38 The  consolidation  between  the  Record  and  the  Union  was  effected,  and  Mills
reciprocated  by  criticizing  the  political  enemies  of  the  railroad  company  and
debunking  the  claims  of  the  anti-monopolists,  although  he  also  pursued  his  own
interests as a reformer. A February 1876 article of the Sacramento Union shows how Mills
battled  against  plans  to  regulate  railroad  rates  at  the state  level  and  supported
Huntington’s fight against Thomas Scott’s attempts to obtain Congressional subsidies
for his Texas Pacific Railroad: he argued that the Archer bill providing for railroad rate
regulation and passed by the California State legislature on 25 February was pushed by
“the  emissaries  of  Colonel  Scott  for  the  express  purpose  of  crippling  the  Southern
Pacific  Railroad”…Mills  charged that  the main instigator of  this  attempt to use the
California  legislators  as  “cat’s  paws  to  pull  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for  a
Pennsylvania railroad king” was the lawyer Alfred Cohen, who at that time had turned
against  the  associates44.  As  many  other  newspaper  editors  from  California  did
(Deverell), Mills fanned the flame of sectionalism: he presented the Southern Pacific as
a Western corporation, while the Texas Pacific was labelled a “foreign corporation”.
39 In public relations as well as in transactions management, the “Big Four” experimented
with a variety of arrangements which cannot easily fit a simple dichotomy between
modern and traditional practices. The “Big Four” did not see credit opportunities and
political benefits as alternatives to the pursuit of low costs and high earnings, but as
components of business success that reinforced each other and should be conducted
jointly.  Their  efforts  to  combine  these  different  elements  fostered  unstable  and
ambiguous  relationships  with  local  notables,  as  well  as  utilitarian  forms  of  “good
neighbor” practices. Although this article was written from the vantage point offered
by the correspondence of the “Big Four”, we can understand that the flexible pattern of
transactions management described here implied a variety of social relations with local
notables.  The  businessmen,  politicians  and  professionals  who  worked  with  the
associates  construed  their  relation  to  the  railroad  corporation  and  to  the  local
community  in  widely  different  ways.  The  “inchoate  networks”  of  unreliable  allies
described in Richard White’s book (White 2011, 101) included the semi-independent
agents or debtor-associates that we have encountered in the course of this study. The
extent to which the practices sketched here also existed in other regions of the U.S., or
in other sectors than the railroad industry –in which the legacy of early-nineteenth
century corporations was more prominent than elsewhere- is a question that cannot be
fully discussed within the scope of this paper. Another issue obviously neglected in this
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paper is the connection between the experiments described here and the constraints
that labor imposed on business strategies.  However, the analysis of the intersection
between management, credit and politics appears as a promising field of inquiry which
may yield fresh perspectives on the history of the Gilded Age. 
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NOTES
1. The letters sent by Huntington’s California associates to New York can be read at the Special
Collections  Research  Center,  Syracuse  University  Libraries.  A  microfilm  edition  of  the
Huntington  papers  is  also  available  at  the  Stanford  University  Library  and  at  the  Bancroft
Library. The other materials are scattered in various research libraries and archive repositories
in California, as the subsequent footnotes will make clear.
2. Facts obtained from the lips of Charles Crocker, regarding his identification with the Central
Pacific railroad and other roads growing from it:  dictation and related material assembled in
preparing  his  biography  from  H.  H.  Bancroft’s  Chronicles  of  the  Builders  of  the  Commonwealth,
1865-1890, folder 1, 19, Bancroft library.
3. George T. Clark, Leland Stanford, War Governor of California, Railroad Builder and Founder of Stanford
University,  London,  Humphrey  Milford-Oxford  University  Press,  1931,  51-55.  Samuel  Ralph
Harlow, H.H. Boone, Life Sketches of the State Officers, Senators and Members of the Assembly of the
State of New York, Albany, Weed, Parsons and Company, printers, 1867, 144-7.
4. Huntington’s testimony before the 1887 Pacific Railroad Commission includes the following
statement: « When we were in Washington, trying to get through the bill to give us aid, a certain
party said that we must cut off our part at Sacramento and they must have the part between
Sacramento and San Francisco, or else we must begin at San Francisco…We consented». Quoted
in Cerinda Evans, Collis Potter Huntington, vol. 1, 94. 
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5. Annual report of the Central Pacific C°, June 1, 1863, 38 th Congress, First session, Senate, Ex.
Doc. n° 26. All stockholders figured as residents of California except one person from Boston,
Massachusetts,  Charles  A.  Lambard.  (Central  Pacific  Railroad  Photographic  History  Museum,
http://cprr.org/Museum/Judah_Report_1863.html#Annual_Report, accessed October 15, 2013)
6. Testimony of Daniel W. Strong, August 4, 1887, Report of the U.S. Pacific Railway Commission and
Testimony Taken by the Commission (hereafter U.S. Pacific Railway Commission Testimony), Washington
D.C., G.P.O., 1888, 2840. 
7. Testimony of Leland Stanford, July 28, 1887, U.S. Pacific Railway Commission Testimony, 2499.
8. Letters of Edwin B. Crocker to Cornelius Cole, March 2, 1864 , April 9, 1864, April 12, 1865. Cole
family papers, box 2, UCLA Special Collections.
9. Charles Crocker to C.P. Huntington, October 30, 1867, Huntington papers, Series I. 
10. On Redding and his  activities  see Richard Orsi,  “The ‘Octopus’  Reconsidered:  the Central
Pacific  and Agricultural  Modernization in California,  1865-1915”,  California  Historical  Quarterly,
vol. 54 n° 3 (Fall 1975), 197-220. 
11. Letter  from  Collis  P.  Huntington  to  “friend  Stanford”,  September  28,  1867.  Huntington
papers, Series I. 
12. “We saw that we must have contractors whom we could control, who could do the work when
we had the money to pay, and who would just push it and be willing to make any kind of sacrifice
that we might call upon them to make”, Testimony of Leland Stanford, July 28, 1887, U.S. Pacific
Railway Commission Testimony, 2625-6.
13. Cerinda  Evans,  Collis  Potter  Huntington,  vol. 1,  96.  Letter  from  Mark  Hopkins  to  C.P.
Huntington, February 10, 1866. Huntington papers, Series I. 
14. Obviously  delighted  with  the  success  of  this  negotiation,  Hopkins  told  this  story  to
Huntington in two letters sent on February 16 and July 10, 1866. 
15. Facts obtained from the lips of Charles Crocker, regarding his identification with the Central
Pacific railroad and other roads growing from it:  dictation and related material assembled in
preparing  his  biography  from  H.  H.  Bancroft’s  Chronicles  of  the  Builders  of  the  Commonwealth,
1865-1890, folder 1, 19. Bancroft library.
16. See the National Bank of D.O. Mills and Company Collection, California State Library.
17. Mark Hopkins to Collis P. Huntington, May 31, 1865, Huntington papers, Series I, reel 1. 
18. Mark Hopkins to C.P. Huntington, July 19, 1865, Huntington papers, Series I. 
19. Edwin B. Crocker to Collis P. Huntington, April 16, 1869, August 19, 1869 (Huntington papers,
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ABSTRACTS
This article proposes an analysis of the network and transactions management practices of the
California “Big Four”, the group of former Gold Rush merchants who built the Central Pacific and
Southern Pacific Railroad companies in the 1860’s and 1870’s. The associates’ decisions in their
dealings  with  business  partners,  professionals  and politicians  in  Northern California  did  not
reflect  simple  alternatives  between  integration  and  market  transactions  as  described  in  the
classical  Chandlerian synthesis  and the mid-twentieth century theory of  the firm. The paper
highlights  the significance of  partnership agreements,  credit  relations  and negotiations  with
local boosters and politicians. It concludes that the “Big Four” did not see credit opportunities
and  political  advantages  as  alternatives  to  good  management  but  as  important  elements  of
business success, on a par with the pursuit of low operating costs and high earnings.
Cet article propose une analyse des pratiques d’un groupe d’entrepreneurs du « Gilded Age »
américain en matière de gestion de réseau et de transactions. Il est centré sur le cas des « Quatre
Grands »  de  Californie,  des  marchands  de  l’ère  de  la  ruée  vers  l’or  qui  construisent  les
compagnies de chemins de fer Central Pacific et Southern Pacific dans les années 1860 et 1870.
Les décisions prises par les quatre associés dans leurs relations avec les hommes d’affaires, les
professionnels de la gestion et les hommes politiques qu’ils côtoient en Californie du Nord ne
relèvent pas d’alternatives simples entre le recours au marché et l’intégration, telles qu’elles sont
décrites dans les synthèses classiques en histoire des entreprises ou dans les théories de la firme
du milieu du vingtième siècle. L’étude met l’accent sur les accords de partenariat, les relations de
crédit et les négociations avec les hommes politiques et les groupes d’intérêts locaux. Elle montre
que  les  « Quatre  Grands »  ne  considèrent  pas  les  opportunités  de  crédit  et  les  avantages
politiques comme des alternatives à une bonne gestion de leurs entreprises, mais au contraire
comme des composantes comme les autres du succès en affaires, qui doivent être conjuguées aux
stratégies de baisse des coûts et d’augmentation des recettes d’exploitation. 
INDEX
Keywords: Western railroads, Gilded Age, California “Big Four”, Entrepreneurs, transactions
management, Central Pacific Railroad Company
Mots-clés: Chemins de fer de l’Ouest des Etats-Unis, Entrepreneurs, « Gilded Age », gestion des
transactions, « Quatre Grands » de Californie, Central Pacific Railroad Company
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